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Abstract
How does the Internet affect authoritarian regimes? This article argues that while the
Internet has made mass mobilization easier than ever, its spread has also counter-intuitively
allowed savvy authoritarian regimes to become more stable than ever. For the population,
higher technical literacy means a demonstrable decrease in transaction costs and thus a
greater incidence of collective action. However, higher regime technical literacy gives au-
thoritarians the capacity to monitor their populations and solve the dictator’s information
problem, thus keeping their populations satisfied without needing to liberalize. The article
compiles a new and original data set of measures of technical literacy across all states since
the year 2000, and uses a factor analysis approach to construct latent measures of popula-
tion and regime technical literacy for all country-years. A large-n, cross-country empirical
approach finds strong evidence of the theorized relationship between technical literacy and
revolution.
1 Introduction
What is the effect of the Internet upon the prospects of democracy?
Popular accounts of the “social media revolutions” of the Color Revolutions and Arab
Spring have prompted a rush of empirical work exploring the relationship between new
communications technologies and regime transition (Alqudsi-ghabra, Al-bannai, and Al-
bahrani, 2011; Hofheinz, 2005; Mackell, 2011; Murphy, 2006; Oghia and Indelicato, 2010;
Sereghy, Bunk, and Preiss, 2012; Stepanova, 2011; Zhuo, Wellman, and Yu, 2011). This
work has largely focused on case studies over short time periods while engaging with the
young, but theoretically rich literature exploring this relationship. Manuel Castells has made
perhaps the most significant single contribution to date in this field, with his massive three
volume work The Information Age (Castells, 2009). Theories of Internet and revolution can
be broadly classified into two distinct categories: those who posit that the Internet’s capacity
for communication should increase the occurrence of revolution in authoritarian regimes, and
those who argue that authoritarian stability should be unaffected (or even improved) by the
rise of the Internet.
Foundational to the first school of thought, Clay Shirky has argued in several works that
the declining transaction costs associated with new communications technologies make it
easier for individuals to organize and solve the collective action problem (Shirky, 2009). Larry
Diamond dubbed such technology “liberation technology” and the Journal of Democracy has
examined regularly the role of technology in increasing the ability of social movements to
resist regimes, in addition to examining the responses of states to this technology. However,
this literature risks a utopian myopia similar to that of work on social capital. In assuming
that technology is a normative good providing liberal tools to populations this work can miss
how the changes wrought by communications technology have also enabled authoritarian
regimes.
The second body of literature has staked out the contrary position, arguing that the
Internet has in fact stabilized authoritarian regimes by enhancing their capacity to monitor
populations (Morozov, 2012), and destabilized nascent democracies by making short term
collective action easy at the expense of building institutions (Faris and Etling, 2008). Others
have focused on more specific socio-political problems that arise from the Internet, such
as the danger of homophily (the self-sorting of individuals into sheltered groups of those
with similar beliefs) (Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2011; Page, 2008; Sunstein, 2009; Wojcieszak
and Mutz, 2009), or implications of a digital divide both cross-nationally and domestically
(Norris, 2001; Schlozman, Verba, and Brady, 2010).
However, neither set of theories matches the observed pattern of revolution in the Internet
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era. The incidence of revolution in the thirty years prior to the millennium, from 1971 to
1999, is significantly lower than the post-Internet period. From 1971 to 1999, 47 revolutions
occurred across 2,417 country-years for authoritarian states. From 2000 to 2013 out of a total
of 769 country-years for authoritarian states, there were 34 revolutions. Since 2000, roughly
one in every 22 authoritarian country-years has seen such a revolution, while in the previous
three decades the rate was roughly one in 51 (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz, 2014). Despite
the period from 1971 to 1999 including the heyday of the “Third Wave” of democratization
and the fall of the Soviet Union, its rate of authoritarian collapse pales in comparison to
that of the Internet era. But neither is the other camp exactly correct: among otherwise
comparable authoritarian states, greater public Internet usage is negatively correlated with
the incidence of revolution, and in fact repressive regimes are more likely to expand Internet
access (Rød and Weidmann, 2015).
I contend that both camps of Internet theory are flawed because they each only have
half the puzzle, and propose that the theoretical insights of the two can be joined into one
generalized explanation. Drawing from the first school of thought, I argue that a popula-
tion’s aptitude with the Internet (which I call population technical literacy) decreases the
transaction costs of collective action and therefore makes the organization of opposition eas-
ier. But pulling from the second camp, I also argue that an authoritarian regime’s aptitude
with the same technologies (which I call regime technical literacy) both makes it easier to
identify dissidents and reveals otherwise hidden policy preferences of the population. Thus a
highly technically literate regime can target the population with policies that repress without
indiscriminate force and placate without liberalization.
In this article, I develop the theoretical bases for these technical literacies, introduce orig-
inal measures for each, and develop a general theory for modeling their interaction (drawing
upon the literatures of regime transitions and arms races). Finally, I empirically test the
theory in a large-n, cross-country regression framework from 2000 to 2013.
2 Technical Literacy and Revolution
Gellner argues in his classic Nations and Nationalism that states encouraged mass lit-
eracy (and the social changes it wrought) in order to industrialize, but then reaped the
consequences of increased public capacities for collective action that culminated in national-
ism and the age of mass movements (Anderson, 1983; Gellner, 1983). In the modern setting,
authoritarian states experience a parallel paradox. They exist in a tension between want-
ing to open up communication (in order to assess public support, efficiently set placating
policy, and reap the benefits of globalized trade that depends on these new communications
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technologies), while simultaneously wanting to repress communication in order to prevent
organization of revolt. Both the 19th and 21st century cases are stories of information. In
the former case, mass literacy allowed states to transmit information and the population to
receive it. The rise of the Internet changed the flow of information again, by largely elimi-
nating the fixed costs of both receiving and sending information for the entire population.
The capacity of the population of a state to take advantage of the ability to transmit using
the various technologies of transmission, I label population technical literacy.
Of course, regimes have their own techniques for attempting to gain the benefits of new
communications technologies as they arise, while limiting their exposure to risk. Telephone
systems can be constructed, but tapped. Computer networks can be built, but monitored.
Postal service is provided, but all mail is read. Photocopiers installed, but duplicates of
all copies retained. Such tactics not only allow the regime to maximize gain and minimize
risk, but help with the dictator’s information problem, giving insight into the true level of
support among the population and what their particular complaints are. However, such
tactics require the regime to have both an additional level of technical expertise in the
particular technology being co-opted, and resources to commit to it. While it does not
require special training to simply read every piece of mail going through the post offices, it
is nevertheless a massive bureaucratic undertaking.
ICTs are trickier, requiring higher orders of technical ability in order to implement se-
lective monitoring or censorship. Egypt, for instance, had the technical ability during the
2011 protests to power down the server facilities that connected the country to the outside
world, but the regime had no capacity for selectively restoring access to particular subsec-
tions of the network. And so network access was restored after ten days, because the regime
could not block opposition communication without also shutting down all non-cash financial
transactions in the economy. Iran, in the wake of the Green Revolution, identified Google-
owned sites as frequently used by the opposition and had the technical capacity to selectively
block them, but had to remove the blocks within days after realizing too late that the entire
legislature’s official state email was hosted on Gmail. Such abilities are not just functions
of throwing resources at the problem, they are also contingent on having the appropriate
human capital to address the problem. Building a domestic version of the “Great Firewall of
China” requires an army of computer programmers that many authoritarian regimes simply
do not have at hand. This particular strain of state capacity, I dub regime technical literacy.
The explanatory power of this theoretical framework emerges from the strategic interac-
tion of population and regime technical literacy. I argue that increased population technical
literacy is associated with an increased probability of organization, up to the point that the
regime’s technical literacy provides it the capacity to solve its information problem. That
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is, the two existing theories of the effect of the Internet on revolution are each correct and
incorrect, with the true effect of the Internet being a function of the two, that is not simply a
zero-sum affair. While technically literate populations are better able to organize, technically
literate regimes are able to better solve their information problem.
In order to model this relationship, I draw from Gehlbach’s simplified version of the
Acemoglu & Robinson redistributive model of regime transition (Acemoglu and Robinson,
2009; Gehlbach, 2012). This model is of an infinitely repeating Markov game that takes one
of three states: dictatorship with a “high attractiveness of revolution,” dictatorship with
a low attractiveness of revolution, and an absorbing state of regime transition. The game
begins in dictatorship and has an exogenously defined probability of which dictatorial state it
is in each turn. There are two players: the elites (or rich) and the non-elites (or poor). Each
turn in dictatorship, the rich determine how much of their own utility to sacrifice and give
to the poor (roughly modeling the notion that there are policies preferred by the poor that
are not preferred by the rich), and the poor determine whether to revolt. If revolt occurs,
the game changes state to regime transition the following turn and policy is thereafter set
exclusively to the preference of the poor. The regime transition state indicates merely that
the existing regime is overthrown, which may substantively mean that it is replaced by either
another dictatorship or by a democracy.
Even this very basic model introduces key strategic tensions. First, the poor are nominally
better off under a new regime since they have a say in policy, but their desire to revolt is
tempered by the fact that revolution is costly. Second, the rich can nominally just set
redistribution equal to zero each turn, but their desire to do so is constrained by the fact
that if life is too miserable for the poor, they will find it cost-beneficial to revolt even though
that will destroy a portion of the country’s resources. So the cost of revolution creates the
revolution constraint. If revolution were costless, the poor would always revolt in this model,
and there would be no point in the rich trying to buy them off with favorable policies,
because they could not give the poor more utility than they’d get under transition anyway.
But if revolution is costly enough, the rich can afford to adopt less desirable policies in order
to placate the poor to the point of enduring the dictatorship’s policies rather than revolting.
The cost of revolution in the high and low states is denoted as µH and µL, respectively,
where µH < µL. The structure of the model is rendered in Figure 1.
The reason for distinguishing between the high and low states is to capture the notion that
in politics, not all turns are created equal. Sometimes exogenous events come together just
right to produce so-called critical junctures, moments at which the political stars align just
right and make collective action a far more likely prospect. The high and low states formalize
the intuitive idea that all turns are not just identical in an institutionally predetermined way,
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Figure 1: Basic Redistributive Game
that the 1989s and 1848s of history are distinct. And further, the way that states transition
in and out of those critical years is a distinct strategic environment that can be modeled.
Regardless of whether the previous turn was in the high or low state, the probability of being
in the high state in the next turn is q (and implicitly, the probability of being in the low
state is 1− q).
In the case of this redistribution game, two categories of outcomes are interesting: equi-
libria in which the rich stay in power indefinitely, and those in which revolution occurs. The
solution concept used in this model is that of a Markov-perfect equilbrium that is also a
stationary equilibrium, which assumes that players’ strategies are determined only by the
current state of the game, and not by past or future events. So under what conditions will
the poor revolt in this game? To answer this, Gehlbach’s simplified version of the Acemoglu
& Robinson model derives the present value utility of the poor and rich using Bellman
equations in order to calculate the conditions under which not revolting yields a preferable
outcome to all players over their alternative choices and derives the following equilibrium
condition for this to be the case:
µH ≥ δ(1− q) (1)
This simple relation lends itself well to comparative statics. First, by inspection it is clear
that revolution is easier to avoid when µH is higher. This prediction makes very intuitive
sense: the stronger the state’s capacity for repression, the less likely the population is to
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revolt. In addition, it is also clear by inspection that as q increases, regime transition is also
less likely. As Gehlbach notes: “the paradoxical conclusion is that the rich may be better
off if the poor pose a frequent revolutionary threat” (Gehlbach, 2012). It is this parameter
that I reinterpret in order to generate empirical predictions about the relationship between
population and regime technical literacy, and the chance of revolution. The probability
of a country shifting into a critical juncture (and staying there in subsequent turns) is a
function of the population’s ability to organize collective action. A society with a low public
capacity for communication is less likely to move into the critical juncture state, while as
the transaction costs of communication drop, shifting from one state to another becomes
less a generational event and more one that is replicable. Therefore, q partially represents
population technical literacy in the context of the model.
However, the probability of shifting out of that critical juncture (and staying out of it in
subsequent turns) is a function of the regime’s ability to monitor the population, whether
in terms of being able to monitor demands such that the population can be bought off
efficiently, or simply being better able to identify leaders and tactics so as to suppress the
potentially historic moment. Thus, q also inversely represents regime technical literacy in
the context of the model. Therefore, all else being equal, as population technical literacy
increases relative to regime technical literacy in an authoritarian regime, the likelihood of
regime transition should decrease.
At face value, it is highly counterintuitive to posit that the better the population is able to
collectively organize, the less likely it is that they will collectively organize to overthrow the
regime. However, one finding from classic work on democratic transitions is that mass protest
tends to yield either full-fledged democratic transition or a retrenchment of authoritarianism
(O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead, 1986). The reason for this is that promises by a
dictator are not credible. By virtue of being an authoritarian in the first place, there is no
enforcement mechanism ensuring that a dictator keeps promises. Thus, a game of chicken
ensues in which the opposition knows that if it lets the historic moment of hundreds of
thousands of people in the streets of the capitol pass without forcing a change of power, then
any promised reforms will fail to materialize as people leave the streets and the pressure on
the dictator dissipates. Increased communication, by making such critical junctures more
likely, ironically diminishes their importance. The increased capacity to organize mass action
reduces the chance of complete democratization, because the ability to replicate critical
junctures means that the population now has a viable mechanism for enforcing authoritarian
promises. Thus, a middle ground of compromise becomes strategically feasible for both
population and regime. However, this is also contingent on the regime being savvy enough
with Internet technologies that it can manage to “read the room”, so to speak, in addition
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to being able to leverage the repressive capacity of the Internet enough to not lose control
entirely.
These competing forces are highly reminiscent of the “contest functions” in the literature
on arms races, in which the probability of success in conflict is modeled as a function of the
relative competing military strength of each side of the conflict (Richardson, 1960; Skaperdas,
1996). As such, I define relative technical literacy as a contest function of both regime (RTL)
and population (PTL) technical literacy:
RelativeTechnicalLiteracy =
PTL
PTL+RTL
(2)
The mathematical advantage of this approach is that it compresses two variables of com-
peting effects into a single operationalizable quantity. It also evinces several qualities at its
limits that reflect our qualitative understanding of how these two measures should interact.
For instance, as regime technical literacy drops near to zero then the function approaches
one. That is, when a regime is completely incapable of dealing with the communicative
capacity of the population, then even minimal organizational capacity by the population is
able to frequently shift the country into the critical juncture state. On the other hand, if
population technical literacy is held constant, then as regime technical literacy grows very
large, then the chance that the country enters the critical juncture state approaches zero.1
3 Operationalization
3.1 Revolution
I use the “New Data on Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions” dataset put
together by Geddes, Wright, and Frantz as the basis for my measure of transition (Geddes,
Wright, and Frantz, 2014). This dataset (which they refer to as the GWF) takes the set
of all states that were authoritarian at some point from 1948 to 2010, and codes on a case
by case basis what happened with each regime transition, drawing heavily upon the work
of Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010) and Alvarez, Cheibub, Limongi, and Przeworski
(2000). It defines regime transition as a point at which the “set of formal and/or informal
1Note that mathematically, at very low levels of RTL, even a minimal amount of PTL dominates. This
can be problematic if using this equation in a formal modeling setting, and has been well analyzed in the
conflict literature, since it leads to substantively unrealistic predictions like a single soldier being sufficient to
win a war if the opposing party is unarmed. However, in the context of this paper no claims are being made
as to the parties strategically choosing a certain level of technical literacy, as those levels are exogenously
determined.
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rules for choosing leaders and policies” is changed. The original variables in this data set of
note are type of subsequent regime, a categorical variable that indicates whether the post-
transition regime was broadly democratic, authoritarian, or neither (i.e. foreign occupied,
ceased to exist, or a collapse of state authority entirely). How regime ended is a categorical
variable indicating one of nine ways that was the primary force behind the regime ending.
This variable includes categories for civil war, foreign occupation, coups, elite change, and
most importantly for this project, mass uprising, which is defined as “widespread, mostly
unarmed demonstrations, riots, and/or strikes”.
For this project, I use a time frame of the years 2000 to 2013. Prior to 2000, wealthy
democracies were the only states with anything approaching widespread Internet access. This
means that prior to that point, there was essentially no variation on any of the independent
variables involving technical literacy, and as such 2000 makes for a sensible starting point in
the study. The year 2013 was selected as the most recent year that data was available for the
variables of interest. Unfortunately, the GWF data set is missing the last three years of that
time frame (which include among other cases, those of the Arab Spring). I have researched
and hand-coded any regime transitions that occurred from 2011 to 2013 according to the
GWF rubric in order to accommodate the missing years. In addition, I have aggregated
GWF’s different types of regime transition into nonviolent (insiders, electoral, and mass
uprising) and violent (military coup, civil war).2
3.2 Technical Literacy
The last century has seen an explosion of distinct forms of communication, each with its
own form of literacy. These new forms of literacy have challenged preconceived assumptions
about measurement. There is a desire in the field of literacy measurement to disaggregate the
technical ability to use something from the literacy required for using it for communication.
Written literacy encourages this dialectic thinking because the technical abilities to use the
written word have become invisible to us through familiarity. But that is because those
abilities are taught at such a young age as to no longer be considered a technical skill. For
example, knowing how to open a book, how to automatically turn it right-side up, that
reading the text of the copyright page is not necessary, that the acknowledgements and
introduction are not part of the actual text, or how to use an index and table of contents
are all technical skills that are implied components of what is meant by “literacy”, but have
2I have excluded transitions coded by GWF as having occurred due to foreign invasion. There are only
two such cases: Iraq and Afghanistan. American occupation of those two states for nearly the entirety of the
time period of the study renders them unsuitable for comparison because of that overwhelming exogenous
factor.
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almost entirely disappeared from any measurement process (Dalton and Proctor, 2009).
Different technologies of communication have different “scaffoldings” that the content is
built upon, and literacy involves understanding the navigation of that scaffolding as much
as it does the raw understanding of the text itself (Dalton and Proctor, 2009). With earlier
forms of literacy, this distinction did not matter as much because consumers of content
required very basic training to be able to successfully use the technology. Compare the
amount of knowledge necessary for knowing how to watch a television and for knowing how
to use a computer. By definition, the use of a television requires one to be literate in its
uses, but the acquisition of that skill set was so trivial and universal as to make “literacy”
an overly complicated framework for looking at it. Once a skill becomes quotidian, whether
through universality or triviality, its measurement becomes irrelevant except in assessing
extreme deficiency.
The fact that new technologies allow individuals to be producers of content rather than
just consumers implies an entirely more complex set of active skills as opposed to previously
passive ones. This has created a proliferation of literacies with adjectives to describe the
ability to use new communications technologies successfully: digital literacy, cyber literacy,
Internet literacy, network literacy, information literacy, media literacy, and the catch all
“new literacies” (Livingstone, Van Couvering, and Thumim, 2009). I have settled on using
the term “technical literacy” in this project as a compromise between the overly general and
the overly specific, and with a desire to avoid the rabbit-hole of the semantics of terminology.
Population technical literacy is the ability of the population to communicate via new
communications technologies, such as the Internet and cell phones. The desire to measure
this concept in a large cross-national context further complicates the picture as it renders
direct measures (such as designing tests of technical literacy under the guise of surveys or
experiments) infeasible. Therefore in order to capture passive access to the Internet, I have
gathered the proportion of the population using the Internet regularly, as a yearly measure
(from 2000-2013) determined by national surveys from the International Telecommunications
Union (ITU, 2013).
The availability of technology needs tempered by a measure of the ability to use that
technology as there can be a great deal of variance in the active level of expertise. Ideally,
we would want to know the level of computer proficiency among the population. This is
important because being able to use a smart phone is one thing, but having the technical
expertise necessary in order to hack that device into a WiFi hotspot when the regime cuts
the cell phone networks is quite another level of knowledge. While it would be ideal to
measure active technical literacy directly, through cross-country testing or surveys, this is a
solution rendered untenable by the resources required. So an indirect measure is required.
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The Linux Kernel Mailing List is the primary listserv for development of the Linux
kernel, which is the core component of the entire operating system.3 That central mailing
list functions not only as a center of debate and discussion over the development and direction
of this chunk of code that runs on a good portion of all electronic devices in the world, but
also records as ‘messages’ changes to the source code committed to the central repository
by people around the world. As Robert Love notes “If the Linux kernel community had
to exist somewhere physically, it would call the Linux Kernel Mailing List home” (Love,
2010). Each of these messages, being an email, contains the source IP address, which can be
used to identify the physical country of origin. This mailing list began in January of 1996,
and thus spans the entirety of this project’s time span. Because Linux kernel development
is a cornerstone of the open source community, and Linux itself has maintained a high
level of technical relevance from the mailing list’s inception to the present day, this meets
the criteria of being long-lived and stable. In addition, work on the project, while skewed
towards Western countries, has been global from its earliest days, and the high level of traffic
(on average, a thousand messages per day at this point) yields sufficient n to ensure that
the measure is not just a dichotomous measure of developed vs. not.
I wrote custom computer code in order to gradually download over a six month period
the entirety of the Linux Kernel Mailing List archives (some 2 million messages from 1996 to
2014). I wrote additional code to process the downloaded messages, extracting the multiple
layers of IP addresses (headers to messages contain each of the servers through which the
message passed on its way to the mailing list’s host), and the source email address. Using a
database that maps ranges of IP addresses to the physical countries in which particular ranges
exist, I identified the country of origin for the vast majority of the messages. In addition,
where source email addresses used country-code specific domains (which was the case in
approximately 20% of messages), I cross-referenced those against the identified country of
origin for the IP address as a robustness check. The two matched in over 95% of cases, which
gave me the confidence to trust the accuracy of the IP address identification method for the
bulk of the records. The resultant data once processed yielded 102,000 unique user-year
pairs, with users posting from 137 different countries. Despite the fact that the distribution
of the messages is heavily skewed towards a handful of western developed countries, the
existence of data from most countries in the world makes it an excellent measure of active
population technical literacy. I logged country-year quantities of LKML activity to adjust
for skew, and then normalized it.
In order to construct my measure of population technical literacy, I used exploratory
3I collected data from the archive located at lkml.org, though there are several other similar archives of
the mailing list.
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factor analysis to extract a single common factor underlying the two input variables of
LKML usage and Internet usage, and normalized the resultant measure to a hundred point
scale for ease of use. Figure
Regime technical literacy is a more difficult measurement challenge because it is a form
of state capacity that is expressed in hidden and indirect ways. The ideal measure would
be one that gives an accurate idea of how capable a state is at using new communications
technology for its own ends. At a very low level, this might be the ability to shut down
the Internet and cellular networks to the country. At a higher level it might encompass
the ability to selectively shutdown only the services that are causing them problems, which
of course implies the ability to tell which services are doing so. The Weberian ideal type
of a perfectly technically literate regime would be a state fully capable of monitoring all
communications and selectively leveraging them for their own ends. There are two problems
with measuring this capacity directly. First, directly measuring whether a state actually
shuts down a network (for instance) is a terrible measure of whether it is capable of doing
so, because the states that have not chosen to do so will be false negatives, lumped in with
states that are incapable of doing so. Second, the more technically literate the regime, the
more subtle of means it is capable of deploying, which are thus more difficult to measure
directly in any way.
I instead endeavor to identify measurable elements of society that betray the capacity
of the state to act without requiring a measurement of action itself. I have identified two
such indirect measures: the pattern of hosting mirrors in states over time, and the sale
of a state’s country-code top-level domains. I will discuss each of these measures in turn,
but what unifies them is that they represent publicly available figures that require large
scale, institutional support. In addition, each requires high technical literacy, without being
connected at all to either politics, or direct action taken by the regime. As such, they are
the sort of measures that we expect to increase hand-in-hand with regime technical literacy,
regardless of the particular political strategies vis-a-vis technology undertaken by the regime.
First, through Internet records, I acquired the number of domains in existence under
each top level country code each year going back to 1990 when the possibility of doing so
first started.4 Top level domains are the two or three letters after the period at the end of
a URL. For example, the familiar “.com” is the most commonly used one in the world. A
number of other general top level domains exist in order to multiply the number of possible
web addresses as demand has grown exponentially: .org, .edu, et cetera (but interestingly,
not “.etc”). Top level country-codes were an innovation established prior to ICANN in the
late eighties. These two letter domains were intended to allow different states to control
different parts of the Internet. For example, URLs ending in “.uk” are from the United
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Kingdom, while “.ru” indicates Russia. These country code top level domains (CCTLDs)
correspond to countries as defined by the ISO, although some exceptions have gotten onto
the list over the years and stayed for one reason or another. For example, “.eu” has been
added for general European Union usage, while “.su” was created for the Soviet Union since
it was still in existence at the time. Russia has retained control over the “.su” domain in
addition to the more contemporaneous “.ru”.
Each of these CCTLDs is held in reserve by ICANN up until the point that the state
in question either takes active control of registrations of domain names or designates a
third party to do so. Typically states have their telecommunications ministry or equivalent
administer the domains. Outside of the United States, the websites and Internet resources
of most state agencies are hosted on domains within their particular CCTLD (American
agencies tend to use the “.gov” extension instead). And so the amount of domains hosted
within the CCTLD is a rough measure for how much the state engages with the Internet
in general. In addition, some states have made the decision to not allow any registration
on their CCTLD other than official state websites, while others have gone to the opposite
extreme and sold domain en masse. Such commercialization is especially common with
CCTLDs that happen to match popular word endings in other languages. For example,
Libya has sold enormous quantities of domains in its “.ly” domain to companies seeking to
take advantage of those letters being the English language adverbial ending (for example,
bit.ly). In a sense, CCTLDs are a free source of income for a state. But they require the
technical capacity to both realize that fact and to capitalize upon it. For these reasons, the
quantity of domains inside each CCTLD is a good measure for regime technical literacy.
An additional component of regime technical literacy is the capacity to commit institu-
tional support for technical causes. An excellent measure of this is the presence of mirrors for
various open source software. Mirrors are exact duplicates of the contents of servers, in order
to help ease the load on any one server. For example, if you download a web browser for your
computer, you might be downloading it from any of hundreds of different servers scattered
around the world rather than a single central server. This serves the purpose of redundancy,
but also of efficiency in ensuring that your download is coming from somewhere physically
nearby on the network to reduce the amount of the network that a given data transfer has
to traverse. Mirrors are not trivial to set up, requiring many gigabytes of dedicated server
space, along with significant bandwidth in order to accommodate large quantities of down-
loads. For this reason, mirrors tend to be hosted at government funded facilities, most often
4The Internet Services Consortium (located at isc.org), a non-profit that helps develop Internet standards
and server software such as BIND and DHCP, keeps a public database of this information. The data is
archived at six month intervals (January and July), so I averaged the January and July figures to arrive at
a single value for the year for each state.
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university research labs.
I have selected several programming languages and server software packages that maintain
records going back to the late nineties.5 Each package shares a number of critical properties.
First, it is a popular enough package that there is a reasonable expectation of there being
enough demand to support a meaningful number of mirrors across many countries. Second,
each by virtue of being programming languages and server installations are apolitical tools
without any of the baggage that might go along with politically meaningful tools such as
blogging software or audio-video software. These represent the raw tools for doing computer
development and thus would be least likely to be targeted for specific political censorship
among software packages. This is important because it makes it a good measure in the
context of this project, in which the potential for political influence on each variable raises the
specter of endogeneity. This is a measure of regime technical literacy from two perspectives.
First, it is a measure of a certain level of state capacity and technical savvy to be able to
recognize the need for and support the institutional deployment of large scale systems like
this in the first place. Second, it represents a dedication on the part of the regime to make
sure that its own population has quicker and more efficient access to such technologies for
their own uses.
Each of the software packages identified above features a mirrors status web page that
updates in real time to add new mirrors as they join the network, or remove other that stop
responding. Mirrors with unreliable connections (or just going down at occasional intervals
for maintenance or loss of network connectivity) might hop on and off that status list with
some frequency. I then accessed cached versions of those status pages going back to the
year 2000 for each of the packages. I wrote a program to download every cached version
along with the appropriate timestamp for each, which amounted to several hundred data
points for each package over the time span, rather than just a static number per year. I then
aggregated those with simple averages for how many mirrors each state had active for each
package over the course of the year, thus capturing variation in the ability to keep mirrors
up, which would be lost in simple annual snapshots.
As with population technical literacy, I perform an exploratory factor analysis on the
three input variables for regime technical literacy and then normalize the output to a hundred
point scale.
Figures 2 and 3 render the estimated population and regime technical literacies for every
state in the world, factored by year. All country-years have a corresponding dot (i.e., the
shown dots are not outliers as is often the case in graphs of this style). The left-right position
5The Apache Web Server, the Comprehensive Perl Archive Network (CPAN), GNU, FreeBSD, and
OpenBSD.
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Figure 2: Box Plot (Median and Quartiles) of Estimated Population Technical Literacies by
Year
Figure 3: Box Plot (Median and Quartiles) of Estimated Regime Technical Literacies by
Year
of a dot within a year does not have statistical or substantive meaning; it is only random
“jitter” in order to make the dots more visible. The boxes in each plot represent the median
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technical literacy in that year, bounded by 25% and 75% quantiles in each direction, while
the whiskers indicate the minimum and maximum.
Of note for both population and regime technical literacy is that they are each steadily
growing over time, which is expected on both fronts due to the growth in Internet technologies
since 2000. Regime technical literacy seems to have leveled off in the last few years of the
sample, which points to perhaps the end of a transitional regime in which regimes that made
strategic decisions regarding investment in their own state capacity have reached a new
equilibrium. Curiously, there remains a significant group of states that have experienced
little to no growth in population technical literacy over time, even as the rest of the world
has steadily increased and pulled the mean up with it. This has the effect in both technical
literacies of the standard deviation remaining more or less constant across all years, even
as the mean has grown faster than the median. This is because while the average literacy
is growing over time, there is a relatively static group of countries at the bottom that are
hardly growing at all. Thus, the skew of the distribution shifts, lifting the mean more quickly
over time than the median.
Finally, I constructed the relative technical literacy variable by plugging in the population
and regime technical literacies for each country-year into equation one.
4 Empirics
Empirical testing of proposed causes of authoritarian failure is a relatively common oc-
currence in political science, and a large literature of existing models exist that can be drawn
upon. As such, rather than reinventing the wheel, I adapt the basic set of control variables
specified in Rød & Weidmann’s 2015 paper Empowering activists or autocrats? The Internet
in authoritarian regimes : log of per capita GDP, percentage GDP growth, log of oil & gas
dependence, log of trade openness, incidence of civil war, log of total population, percent of
population that is urban, and dummy variables for whether the regime was military, monar-
chy, or personalistic (Rød and Weidmann, 2015). This suite of variables is representative of
the field of cross-country work on determinants of authoritarian failure.
Though in their empirical work, the Internet ends up having the no discernible statistical
effect on authoritarian regime transition, my framework provides a possible explanation
for this anomaly beyond Rød & Weidmann’s conclusion that the Internet must be more a
tool of repression than a tool of liberation. Were that simple explanation the case, their
empirical work should have instead demonstrated a significant but negative relationship
between the Internet and democratization, rather than no relationship at all. Since the
two primary schools of thought on the matter posit that the Internet should have some
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effect (one claiming positive, one claiming negative), then finding no effect is not indicative
that the negative school is correct, but that there is a more complex relationship than just
positive or negative. My theoretical framework of a contest function between population and
regime technical literacy serves exactly that purpose. As such, replacing the Internet usage
variable in Rød & Weidmann’s framework with my measure of relative technical literacy,
is an efficient way of testing my theory within the context of the larger regime transition
literature.
In addition, I run additional models in order to control for additional theories that have
become standard alternative explanations for when and why authoritarian regimes collapse,
especially in light of the Color Revolutions and Arab Spring. First, a strong argument has
been made that diffusion accounts for an important component of authoritarian fragility,
predicting that revolutions tend to beget revolutions in nearby countries (Beissinger, 2007;
Bunce and Wolchik, 2010; Bunce and Wolchik, 2011). To operationalize this, I combined
the GWF regime transition data set described in detail in the last section with a standard
coding from the Quality of Government Institute that places each state in one of ten regions
(Teorell et al., 2015).6 I coded this by creating a dichotomous variable that was set to zero
for all states in the year 2000. When an authoritarian regime transition of any sort occurred
in any state within a region in a year, then the variable was set to one for all subsequent years
after for all states in that region. In the discussion that follows, this variable is referenced
as Diffusion.
However, others have argued that the Color Revolutions in particular show too much
variation in technique to be the product of diffusion, and that although the three early and
successful Color Revolutions were relatively close to each other chronologically, their occur-
rence is better explained by a combination of electoral cycles and regime weakness (Hale,
2005; Hale, 2006; Way, 2008). In order to operationalize the former, a dichotomous variable
was created indicating whether each state had national legislative or executive elections in
that year, populated using the Global Database on Elections and Democracy (Democracy
and Assistance, 2016). In the discussion that follows, this variable is referenced as Election.
5Using my measure of population technical literacy in place of their measure of Internet usage yields
substantially similar results across the board in the regression results presented in this paper. I present the
results using their measure for the sake of parsimony: that is, the only change I am making to their basic
model as presented is adding my variable of interest and updating the end point of the data from 2010 to
2013.
6The regions and their bounds are: “1. Eastern Europe and post Soviet Union (including Central
Asia); 2. Latin America (including Cuba, Haiti & the Dominican Republic); 3. North Africa & the Middle
East (including Israel, Turkey & Cyprus); 4. Sub-Saharan Africa; 5. Western Europe and North America
(including Australia & New Zealand); 6. East Asia (including Japan & Mongolia); 7. South-East Asia; 8.
South Asia; 9. The Pacific (excluding Australia & New Zealand); 10. The Caribbean (including Belize,
Guyana & Suriname, but excluding Cuba, Haiti & the Dominican Republic)”
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State weakness is operationalized using the number of individuals serving in the armed forces
per capita, which is available in the World Development Indicators database (World Bank,
2015). While this is a less than ideal measure – the size of the armed forces is guarantee
neither of their quality or willingness to follow orders – it is an operationalization that has
become standardized in the field for lack of a less flawed measure (Albertus and Menaldo,
2012; Francisco, 1995; Hanson and Sigman, 2013; Hendrix, 2010; Soifer, 2008). For this
measure, there were several country-years of missing data, which I interpolated by taking
the mean of the preceding and following years. There was low enough year-to-year variance
in this data that more complex interpolative techniques were deemed unnecessary. In the
discussion that follows, this variable is referenced as Coercive Capacity.
The following equation describes the general model:
Pr (Revolution it) = xitβ1 + qitβ2 + zitβ3 + θi + γt + it (3)
Where xit is a three element row-vector of the variables for country i in year t required
for the alternate hypotheses detailed above (Election, Diffusion, and Coercive Capacity),
qit is the relative technical literacy calculated from the derived values of population and
regime technical literacy ( PTL
PTL+RTL
), zit is a vector of the control variables specified in Rød
& Weidmann, θi is a 76 element vector of country-fixed effects, γt is a 14 element vector for
year-fixed effects, and it is an idiosyncratic error.
Table 1 shows the regression results of democratic transition upon several models of
slightly different independent variables for illustrative purposes.7 This table reports the
coefficients of each variable along with the standard error in parentheses. All models use
country and year fixed effects. Models 1 and 2 use a dichotomous dependent variable of
whether the authoritarian regime experienced regime failure, whereas models 3 and 4 use
V-Dem’s measure of polyarchy as the dependent variable and then (Coppedge et al., 2017a;
Coppedge et al., 2017b; Coppedge et al., 2017c; Coppedge et al., 2017d; Marquardt and
Pemstein, 2017; Pemstein et al., 2015).
First, note that as Rød & Weidmann model found, internet usage is not significant in
either model it is included in, but relative technical literacy is, and has a negative effect on
the likelihood on both democratic transition and level of polyarchy, which is consistent with
my theory’s prediction. Second, note that the addition of relative technical literacy scantly
shifts the other significant variables at all, showing that it is introducing an explanatory
element independent from those already in the model. Third, that finding holds up with
little change even when country and year fixed effects are included, while the other covariates
7Each of these models was run using the lm function in R.
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Table 1: Impact of Internet Usage and Technical Literacy upon Democratization
Dependent variable:
Democratic Transition Polyarchy
(1) (2) (3) (4)
% Internet penetrationt−1 0.0002 −0.0001
(0.0004) (0.0004)
Relative Technical Literacy −0.047∗ −0.045∗∗
(0.026) (0.021)
ln(GDP pc)t−1 −0.008 −0.002 −0.038∗∗ −0.035∗∗
(0.019) (0.019) (0.016) (0.015)
GDP pc growtht−1 0.012 −0.001 0.098∗∗ 0.095∗∗
(0.056) (0.053) (0.046) (0.044)
ln(Trade openness)t−1 −0.001 0.0004 0.038∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010)
ln(Oil/gas income)t−1 −0.0003 −0.0004 −0.001 −0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Ongoing civil war 0.016 0.016 0.001 0.001
(0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008)
Military regime −0.001 −0.006 0.057 0.053
(0.091) (0.091) (0.074) (0.074)
Monarchy 0.069 0.083 0.137 0.143
(0.124) (0.123) (0.126) (0.118)
Personalist regime 0.006 −0.002 0.060 0.056
(0.036) (0.035) (0.082) (0.082)
ln(Total population)t−1 −0.002 0.004 0.115∗∗ 0.119∗∗
(0.043) (0.043) (0.052) (0.050)
% Rural populationt−1 0.042 0.060 0.128 0.132
(0.184) (0.182) (0.145) (0.145)
Constant 0.072 −0.075 −1.574∗ −1.653∗
(0.762) (0.743) (0.878) (0.856)
Observations 769 769 729 729
Adjusted R2 0.572 0.574 0.910 0.911
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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of the Rød & Weidmann model drop out of significance due to their very nearly constancy
over the time of the study (and thus their variance is just absorbed by the fixed effects).
And while I do not report the individual coefficients of the country and year fixed effects
directly, they do contain some expected patterns. For instance, the fixed effect for 2011 (the
height of the Arab Spring), is highly significant and positive in all models using fixed effects.
Figure 4 renders the effects of relative technical literacy upon the chance of democratic
regime transition, based on the regression run in model four. The ticks on the x-axis rep-
resent individual country-year data points. At very low values, relative technical literacy
has a positive effect on the chance of democratization, while at higher levels, the effect is
increasingly negative. This follows from the theoretical expectation that when regime tech-
nical literacy is very low relative to the population, the population is better able to organize
without any offsetting capability by the regime. And at higher levels, it should have an
increasingly negative effect as the regime is better able to accommodate the population and
move the country out of any critical junctures that develop. The magnitude of the effect for
higher values of relative technical literacy is to decrease the dichotomous regime transition
variable by about 0.02. While this seems at first glance a minor effect, recall that this is the
chance of transition in a given country-year, and that over the time range of 2000 to 2013,
only 18% of authoritarian regimes underwent regime transition. Thus, a two percentage
point per year shift is in relative terms quite substantively significant.
In addition, I run these regressions using three different dependent variables to tease out
some additional explanatory power: democratic transition, nonviolent transition, and violent
transition (as defined in the previous section’s discussion of the GWF data set). Table 2
reports the regression results of the three additional models with the additional alternative
explanation variables added.
Relative technical literacy displays behavior consistent with my theory. It is a negative
and significant predictor of democratization as my theory suggests, but less so in the case
of predicting nonviolent transition. However, it is positive and significant as a predictor of
violent transition. This is reflecting how when authoritarian regimes do have the capacity
via technical literacy to remain stable, if they fall, it will be violently, because they have the
capacity to deal with nonviolent opposition efficiently.
The diffusion variables provide mixed support for their theorized effect, being only signif-
icant in the nonviolent context. These results support the idea that while having revolutions
in the same region is associated with an increase in the fall of authoritarian regimes through
nonviolent means, it is not ‘democratic values’ so much as instability that is sparked by
neighboring instability. Or in other terms: the fact that instability tends to spread within a
region is not indicative of the population’s organizational capacity to construct a democratic
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Figure 4: Effects of Relative Technical Literacy on Democratic Regime Transition
regime in the wake of the previous regime’s fall.
A similar effect can be seen with regard to the behavior of the Internet penetration
variable, having a positive and significant impact (though admittedly, a substantively very
slight one given the magnitude of the coefficient) on whether nonviolent authoritarian col-
lapse occurs. As with the diffusion variable, this supports the idea of the Internet helping
the population solve their collective action problem, but being able to do so does not in
any way increase the ability to solve the problem of how to consolidate democracy having
overthrown the regime in question.
On the other hand, the literature arguing that authoritarian elections represent critical
junctures finds strong support in both models one and two, with the occurrence of elections in
an authoritarian state in the prior year being a strong positive indicator of the possibility of
both nonviolent regime transition generally, and democratic transition specifically. Finally,
coercive capacity is decidedly insignificant in models five and six, although it does have
the expected sign and high significance for model seven, in that an increase in the regime’s
coercive capacity reduces the chance that it will experience a violent fall.
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Table 2: Impact of Different Theories on Varieties of Regime Transitions
Dependent variable:
Democratization Nonviolent Transition Violent Transition
(5) (6) (7)
Relative Technical Literacy −0.053∗∗ −0.0832∗ 0.072∗
(0.027) (0.054) (0.043)
% Internet penetrationt−1 0.0003 0.001∗ −0.0004
(0.0004) (0.001) (0.001)
Diffusion 0.010 0.054∗∗∗ −0.006
(0.009) (0.018) (0.015)
Election 0.012∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ −0.005
(0.005) (0.011) (0.008)
Coercive Capacity 0.003 0.016 −0.035∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.011) (0.009)
ln(GDP pc)t−1 −0.009 −0.077∗ −0.018
(0.020) (0.039) (0.031)
GDP pc growtht−1 0.012 0.223∗∗ 0.143
(0.056) (0.112) (0.089)
ln(Trade openness)t−1 0.0003 0.001 0.004
(0.008) (0.016) (0.013)
ln(Oil/gas income)t−1 −0.0001 0.0003 −0.0001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Ongoing civil war 0.015 0.011 0.032∗
(0.010) (0.021) (0.017)
Military regime −0.013 0.309 0.042
(0.094) (0.189) (0.150)
Monarchy 0.095 0.378 −0.057
(0.125) (0.251) (0.200)
Personalist regime −0.002 0.111 0.139∗∗
(0.042) (0.084) (0.067)
ln(Total population)t−1 0.002 −0.132 −0.076
(0.046) (0.092) (0.073)
% Rural populationt−1 0.052 0.458 −0.297
(0.184) (0.370) (0.293)
Constant −0.005 2.269 1.560
(0.804) (1.620) (1.285)
Country Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes
Observations 769 769 769
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 3: Democratic and Autocratic Change, by Relative Technical Literacy
Democratic Transition Authoritarian Transition No Transition
Above median: (3 states) (2 states) (23 states)
Haiti Egypt e.g.
Tunisia Morocco China
Yugoslavia Iran
Russia
Below median: (13 states) (8 states) (27 states)
e.g. e.g. e.g.
Lebanon Malaysia Botswana
Thailand Kyrgyzstan Laos
Ukraine Libya North Korea
5 Discussion
Table 3 details which states experienced transitions of which type: transition to democ-
racy, transition to a different authoritarian regime, and regimes that experienced no tran-
sition. In order to highlight the possible effects of relative technical literacy, the table is
further subdivided into states with a relative technical literacy that is either below or above
the median value of relative technical literacy for all states. The year used is either 2013 (in
the case of regimes that did not fall) or the year in which a transition occurred.
Note just how stable authoritarian regimes with higher than the median relative technical
literacy are over the last fifteen years. Of the 26 total instances of authoritarian regime
transition, only four of them took place in states with a relative technical literacy above the
median for the year of the transition, one of which was Yugoslavia in the very first year of
the study (2000). Of the 28 states with above median values, only 5 experienced transition
(18%), while 21 of the 48 (44%) states below the median experienced transition. Because
it is tabular count data, the statistical significance of this pattern can be assessed with a
χ2 test. In this case, the test statistic calculates out to 5.27, with two degrees of freedom,
which is relatively significant at a p = 0.07. This is a powerful illustration of the theory at
work, showing a distinct pattern in line with theoretical predictions.
The examples presented in the table also help evaluate whether the theory seems to be
operating according to what we know about the countries within each cell. The states in
the two bottom left cells are represent the overwhelming majority of authoritarian regime
transitions that occurred from 2000 to 2013, and are typified by regimes that were faced
with mass mobilization and appeared to have little capacity to respond effectively to popular
demands.
The top right cell is perhaps the best indicator at face value of the mechanism that
I theorize. The typical cases are the authoritarian regimes like Russia, China, and Iran
that have evinced a relatively high usage of the Internet by the population, that has been
matched by highly mobilized regime capacity for using the Internet for nuanced purposes.
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China is perhaps the most prototypical case, with reports of some 50,000 full time state
employees dedicated to monitoring and reading online social media, aided by the systematic
deployment of state-owned (and heavily policed) alternatives to popular foreign online ap-
plications. In addition, China has actively demonstrated the partial reform mechanism at
work. For example, the rise of environmental protest in China over the last decade has been
met not with widespread repressive crackdown as might have been expected a generation
ago, but with piecemeal environmental reforms in response to specific protests. Secure in
knowing when and where protest will happen due to comprehensive social media monitor-
ing, and willing to forgo coercive force when the political demands are limited to specific
local grievances, China’s regime is a prototype for authoritarians who would placate without
liberalizing. And their population acts as a similar model for the theorized mechanism of
making limited demands because of confidence in being able to mobilize again if the regime
reneges on promises.
While no regime matches China’s for sheer sophistication in this regard, the others in the
bottom right cell, those that had above median relative technical literacy and were stable,
also share many of the same characteristics. Putin’s regime in Russia has made steady
progress towards a high level of regime technical literacy, with examples abounding of the
regime’s utilization of Internet technologies for subtle purposes. For instance, the regime
has gradually consolidated social media networks used by Russians under the umbrella of
corporations friendly to the regime, whether they are domestic companies (like vKontakte)
or foreign ones (like the California-based Live Journal, which is the blogging platform used
by the vast majority of Russian bloggers). In addition, the creation of a large network of
professional online “trolls” and artifical news agencies to feed false information onto Russian
language social media and Internet sites, especially in the wake of the war in Ukraine in
2014 represents an expansion of the regime’s ability to ensure that possible critical junctures
are quickly delegitimized through seemingly grassroots efforts. Finally, small examples of
the partial reform mechanism continue to proliferate. For example, the use of street art
that paints the faces of local government officials around gaping potholes in roads, and then
posting the art online has acted as a sort of public shaming of local officials (and resulted in
the filling in of potholes that are repeatedly defaced).
Forcing an authoritarian regime to fill potholes might seem a trivial concession from one
perspective, but in another way it is the perfect representation of the mechanism at work here.
Authoritarian regimes do not fall when idealists demand democracy for democracy’s sake,
for idealists are few and easily dispatched. Authoritarian regimes fall when normal people
with mundane concerns take to the streets by the millions, because they have been driven to
the breaking point by unresponsive government. They fall when people are sufficiently angry
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about the potholes. It is profoundly ironic that the Internet, in giving people a voice, also
makes it easier for dictators to listen to them and therefore alleviate the mundane problems
that in previous generations would mount to a boiling point.
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